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Introduction 
RELmF FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS-
THE NEW YORK SOLUTION• 
by 
Peter M. Edelstein •• 
When teaching "corporations," have you ever felt that there was a larger than 
usual disparity between the subject as taught and the probable future experiences of 
our students? The classic features of a corporation-limited liability, perpetual 
duration, ease of transferability of interest, and centralized management, seem so 
remote from the intimate, close corporations many of our students are likely to deal 
with. 
After graduation, A Abbie, in the front row, B. Benny, who sits behind her and 
C. Cindy in the back, may fonn "ABC Cookie Corp.", to exploit C. Cindy's recipe for 
chocolate chip cookies. They will invest their life's savings, devote all of their time and 
efforts to the success of the ventW'e, and dream of lifetimes of happy employment 
including handsome compensation packages, bonuses and benefits. They may even 
look forward to the day they will sell their interests, retire to Hawaii and be 
remembered as the latest incarnations of"Famous Amos." 
They will each be shareholders, board members, and officers. They will 
probably not conduct regular board meetings, have annual shareholder's meetings, 
• 0 Copyright 1994, Peter M. Edelstein. 
·• Professor of Law, Pace University, Pleasantville, New York. 
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keep minutes, nor observe any but the minimum corporate fonnalities; and those only 
when threatened by their lawyer or accountant 
To these three individuals, the classic C9IJ)Otate features we taught them are 
mostly irrelevant. As to perpetual duration, they know that they can dissolve the 
corporation at any time and, if they are not good corporate citizens, the state may 
dissolve it for them. As to ease of transferability of their interests, they are concerned 
with the opposite-restricting the transfer of shares, and they will probably execute a 
shareholder's agreement to that effect. As to centralized management, they each have 
the powers and rights of shareholders, officers and directors, but are not really sure 
what the differences are, or why they exist, because they do everything together 
anyway. 
A. Abbie, B. Benny and C. Cindy probably consider themselves to be 
"partners." The corporate form of business may have been selected only for its 
supPosed insulation from personal liability. But even that attribute is mostly 
imaginary today in matters of contract liability to lending institutions, landlords and 
major vendors, due to the routine requirement of personal guarantees. 
ABC Cookie Corp. may operate hannoniously for years, with the individuals 
making all business decisions by persuasion of the majority. When, however, A 
Abbie and B. Benny get married, and pool their interests to consistently polarize the 
two of them on one side of each issue and C. Cindy on the other, C. Cindy could 
suffer dramatically. Now, governance by the majority means that C. Cindy has no 
effective voice. If the relationship deteriorates to the point that C. Cindy is no longer 
able or allowed to participate in the business of the corporation, she may experience 
the loss of her employment, the loss of her compensation, the loss of any return on her 
investment and the loss of all of her reasonable expectations for her future. A bad 
novelist might say that "all of her dreams were shattered." 
Just as we, as instructors, sense that most of our students will not become 
CEO's of large, publicly traded corporations (and that, therefore, lectures relating 
exclusively to such corporations may not be entirely relevant to their business future), 
the legislature and the courts of the State of New York have aclmowledged that 
shareholders in close corporations have special needs. 1 
New Y orlc recognizes the practical difference between being a shareholder in a 
large publicly held corporation and being a shareholder in a close corporation, 
particularly in instances of shareholder oppression. All shareholders may pursue the 
traditional remedies of direct or derivative actions against the corporation and the 
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board of directors to remedy perceived wrongs. Shareholders in publicly traded 
corporations also have the ability to become instantly liquid. The aggrieved 
shareholder can dispose of his or her shares by selling them for market value through a 
stock exchange or stock market transaction. To shareholders in a close corporation, 
instant liquidity may not be available and the other remedies may not be practical. 
This paper discusses the statutory cause of action for "oppression" by the corporate 
majority against the minority, what behaviors constitute oppression and two defenses 
recently raised by a defendant-majority shareholder in an oppression case in New 
York County. 
A Cause OfAction For Oppression 
The New York legislature, in 1979, reacting to section 97 of the ABA-ALI 
Model Business Corporation Act (1972 ed.) and to the statutes already passed in 
twelve other states,2 adopted Business Corporation Law section 1104-a3 to afford 
certain protections to minority shareholders, in closely held corporations, who were 
oppressed by the majority. 
BCL section 1104-a (and its corollary, BCL section 1118t" ... created 
remedies for minority shareholders of close corporations and may be considered 
legislative recognition of the fact that the relationships among shareholders of such 
corporations closely approximated that among partners."5 Section offers to 
minority shareholders of close corporations the weighty remedy of involuntary 
dissolutiott It provides, in relevant part: 
"The holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding 
shares of a co.rporation ... no shares of which are listed on a national 
securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-col.IDter 
market. .. who are entitled to vote in an election of directors may present 
a petition of dissolution on one or more of the following grounds: (I) 
The directors or those in control of the corporation may have been 
guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the minority 
shareholders ... "6 
"Oppression" is not defined in the BCL. Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, an 
authority on "squeeze-<Juts" of minority shareholders, formulared a test for 
"oppression" which was included in the legislative materials of the statute's cosponsors 
in 1979.7 In describing the need for such a iest, Professor O'Neal stated: 
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"Many participants in closely held corporations are 'little 
people,' unsophisticated in business and financial matters. Not 
uncommonly a participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his 
assets in the business with an expectation. often reasonable under the 
circumstances even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be 
a key employee in the company and will have a voice in business 
decisions. "8 
The "reasonable expectations" test has been the benchmark for determining 
oppressive actions from the first New York case, in 1980, to deal with BCL section 
I104-a,9 and has been described as follows: A shareholder who reasonably expected 
that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of 
corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other fonn of security, 
would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat 
those expectations and there is no effective means of salvaging the investment. 10 
In the seminal case of In the Matter ofTooner.11 the Court found "oppression" 
by the controlling shareholder, based on the following facts: " ... [B}usiness ... flourished 
in the brief one-year period during most of which Petitioner Topper has actively 
participated," 12 " ••• Petitioner Topper associated himself with [the other two 
shareholders and the corporations] in the expectation of being an active 
parti.cipant...,''13 "Petitioner put his life savings into the venture."14 [Petitioner] 
executed personal guaranties ... "15 " ... [T]he majority shareholders ... discharged 
petitioner as an employee, tenninated his salary ... removed him as an officer ... and 
changed the locks on the corporate offices to exclude him."16 
The Court held, based on the foregoing facts: " ... [R]espondent's actions have 
severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and constitute a freeze-out of 
petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to be 'oppressive' within the 
statut01y framework." 17 
Since the Topper decision, the courts of New York have consistently found 
"oppression" within the meaning of BCL section 1104-a by application of the 
"reasonable expectations" test. Jvfinority shareholders have been granted relief from 
the oppression of the majority in the following circumstances: 
• Petitioner, a thirty-five percent shareholder, was expelled from any role in the 
and removed as an officer and a director.18 
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• Petitioner, a one-third shareholder with two other shareholders, was frozen 
out of active operations of the corporation. There existed no shareholder's or any other 
written agreement with respect to the operation of the corporation. there were no 
bylaws and many organizational formalities were ignored.19 
• Petitioners, both long tenn employees (one for forty-two years, the other for 
thirty-six years) had invested capital in the corporation. After leaving. they were 
"frozen out" Their experience had been that when with the company they received 
distributions of the company's earnings. After they left, they received nothing. The 
court held: " When the majority shareholders of a close coxporation award de facto 
dividends to all shareholders except a class of minority shareholders, such a policy 
may constitute 'oppressive actions' ... "20 
• Petitioner, actively engaged in family business, was discharged as an officer 
and employee (of all the family · corporations), locked out of the building and 
threatened with criminal prosecution if he trespassed on any of the corporate 
properties.21 
• Petitioner joined the corporate venture pursuant to an tmderstanding that he 
would be provided with salaried employment to continue as long as the corporation 
existed; bis salary was terminated. 22 
• Petitioner-employee, a twenty·five percent shareholder and employee of a 
family-owned corporation was terminated, was denied entry to the corporate office by 
use of a padlock and was denied further salary and 
• Petitioner, a one-third shareholder and employee, was suspected of: expense 
account irregularities, making generous "gifts" to clients, double-billing the 
corporation for the same expense, holding himself out to be the president (which he 
was not), and engaging in a side business (which may or may not have been in 
competition with the corporation). He was tenninated, the locks were changed, he 
was removed as an officer and director?4 
In all of the foregoing illustrations, the common theme was the conduct of the 
majority that substanti.ally defeated the expectations of the minority that were 
reasonable under the circwnstances. The disappoinunent of the minority shareholders 
constituted oppression. zs 
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Dissolution Or Buv-out 
Section 1104-a, by its tetmS, affords the "oppressed" shareholder with a cause 
of action for involuntary dissolution. This may or may not be a satisfactory remedy 
under the particular circwnstances. However, when the oppressed nrinority 
shareholder combines the threat of dissolution with BCL section 1118, a weapon of 
substantial practical utility is created. 26 That section provides a court sanctioned 
mechanism for dispute resolution far broader than an order for dissolution alone. In all 
but the most unusual circumstances, the minority shareholder wants to be free from the 
oppressive majority, to cash out, and to be able to invest and work elsewbez:. The 
statutory remedy of dissolution under section 1104-a alone, may not proVlde the 
shareholder with the means or the opportunity to pursue his or her chosen career. The 
lawsuit may continue for years, and the book value of the shares may decrease durin? 
the process of litigation due to the distraction of management and the costs involved. 2 
Section 1118, entitled "Purchase of petitioner's shares; valuation.", provides in 
relevant part: 
"(a) In any proceeding brought pursuant to section eleven 
hundred of this chapter, any other shareholder or shareholders or 
the corporation may, at any time within ninety days after the filing of 
such petition or at such later time as the court in its discretion may 
allow, elect to purchase the shares owp.ed by the petitioners at their fair 
value and upon such terms and conditions as may be approved by the 
court. (b) If one or more shareholders or the corporation elect to 
purchase the shares owned by the petitioner but are unable to agree with 
the petitioner upon the fair value of such shares, the court, upon the 
application of such prospective purchaser or purchasers, or the 
petitioner may stay the proceedings brought by pursuant to section 
11 04-a of this chapter and determine the fair value of the petitioner's 
shares as of the day prior to the date on which such petition was filed, 
exclusive of any element of value arising from such filing ... " 
The result of these two sections, 1104-a and 1118, is to provide the oppressed 
minority shareholder with more than just a remedy for involuntary dissolution. 
Together, they give the shareholder the power to negotiate, with judicial imprimatur, to 
cause the majority to seriously consider buying out the minority. Failure to do so 
raises the possibility of forced dissolution or forced purchase of the minority shares, 
with the comt detennining the value as of the date of the petition. 
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This additional statutoxy remedy not only broadens the scope of 11 04-a, but 
effectively changes its nature from a rifle approach to dissolution to a shotgun 
approach to dispute resolution, which can be used to effectuate settlement of a myriad 
of shareholder questions. 
No Conflict With The Employment Will Doctrine 
New York retains the doctrine of employment at-will by which an employer, in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may terminate an employee at any time 
for cause or for no cause.28 
An imaginative defendant-majority shareholder, in a case now before the 
Supreme Court, New York County, In the Matter of The Application of Michael P. 
Lyons/ 9 asserted as a defense, that the existence of the employment at-will doctrine 
precluded the plaintiff-minority shareholder from alleging "oppression" under section 
1104-a. In that case, the controlling shareholder swnmarily dismissed the petitioner-
minority shareholder as an employee and removed him as an officer and director, all 
without prior notice or warning. The locks on the doors of the corporation were 
changed and the petitioner-minority shareholder was denied compensation. The 
theory of the defendant-majority shareholder amoWlted to an argument that because 
under New York law, an .employee at-will can be terminated at any time, any 
tennination cannot amount to oppression. This defense ignores the gravamen of 
section 1104-a. The section does not prohibit the termination of the shareholder· 
employee, but rather, it provides a remedy for the oppression of that shareholder-
employee. It is not the loss of the employment per se that is central to the spirit of the 
statute, but the loss of one's reasonable expectations for one's future under the totality 
of the circumstances. 
. The courts in New Y otk, weighing the right to terminate an employee against 
the nght of that employee to be free from oppression, have addressed the issue in the 
form of the relevance of the conduct of the terminated minority shareholder, and have 
held: "Whether the Controlling Shareholder discharged petitioner for cause or in their 
good business judgment is irrelevant. "30 
In one case,31 the petitioner-minority shareholder had stolen from the 
COiporation. The court, in applying BCL section 1104-a, went as far as to pronounce: 
"Even Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengefulness of his fellow man 
(Genesis 4:12-15) ... The Court is not without jurisdiction to fashion a remedy here.'m 
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In a similar case, the court, applying BCL section 1104-a, cited Top,per-'3 and 
held: " .. .'unclean hands' is not an automatic bar ... " to relief under BCL section 1104-
a. 34 "Only when a 'minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith and 
Wldertaken with a view toward forcing involWltaiy dissolution, give rise to the 
complained-of oppression' should relief be barred. "35 
In a recent Putnam County case, referred to above, Judge Dickinson was faced 
with a petitioner-minority shareholder about whom the controlling shareholder alleged 
expense account irregularities, the giving of unauthorized 11gifts," double-billing, 
holding himself out as president of the corporation, (which he was not), conducting a 
"side business" with his brother-in-law and theft of business. The Court citing 
Top,per"6 and similar cases, held: "The ... Petitioner may not be prevented from seeking 
dissolution merely because he is guilty of one or more of the charges made against 
bim."37 
Corporate lnfonnalitv Is Not Inconsistent With The Application Of Bel Section 11 04-a 
The defendant-majority shareholder, in the Lyons31 case, also defended on the 
grounds that the minority shareholder did not have a written employment agreement, 
nor did there exist records of the corporation to support the claim of oppression; 
presumably on the theory that a corporation operated in less than text book fashion 
should be free to oppress its minority shareholders. 
The informality with which closely held corporations operate, has long been 
held not to bar application of BCL section 11 04-a. On the issue of fonnality, as on the 
issue of oppression, the nature of close corporations has been recognized to be 
substantially different from large or publicly held corporations. 
Professor O'Neal commenting on the application of BCL section 11 04-a states: 
''Not uncommonly a participant in a closely held entetprise invests all his assets in the 
business with an expectation, often reasonable under the circumstances even in the 
absence of express contract, that he will be a key employee in the company and will 
have a voice in business decisions"39 (emphasis added). 
The comts in New York have recognized that corporate formalities are 
frequently ignored in close corporations. ln finding for the petitioner, it has been 
held: nThe parties did not enter into any shareholders' or any other written agreement 
with respect to the operation of the Corporation and many organizational 
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formalities ... do not seem to have taken place prior to the institution of this 
proceeding. "40 
"The failure to make [the petitioner] a shareholder until April 1974, merely 
reflects the informality with which close corporations are frequently ron and the 
informality which [BCL] section 1 104-a is intended to remedy41 (emphasis added} 
Conclusion 
The promulgation of BCL sections 11 04-a and 1118, and court decisions 
thereunder, are legislative and judicial recognition that participants in close 
corporations should be governed by the classic rules applicable to large publicly 
traded COJPOrations. Special rules apply to shareholders in close co!porations, many of 
whom view themselves as partners for the purpose of governance, and as shareholders 
for the purpose of enjoying the reiU or imagined benefits of limited liability. 
Section 1104-a has provided minority shareholders with a serious weapon-the 
threat of involuntary dissolution. In practice, section 1118 has converted section 1104-
a into a powerful tool to provide an equitable resolution to fundamental problems 
between or among shareholders. By application of the two sections, a negotiated 
settlement between the minority and the majority_ is likely to result. 
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FRONT PAY: AN INAPPROPRIA1E REMEDY FOR 
AGE DISCRIMINATION 
by 
John McGee· 
Successful plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976 
(hereafter referred to as the ADEAY may recover lost pay from the date of 
termination until trial (back pay) plus the pay they would have received from the 
date of trial until retirement age (front pay). While courts can easily calculate back 
pay, including fringe benefits and interest, it has proven far more difficult to accurately 
calculate front pay. A typical description of front pay as "a lump swn representing the 
discounted present value of the difference between the earnings an employee would 
have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive in 
his present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment"2 requires the court to 
speculate about the amount an employee would have received in the future until some 
hypothetical retirement date. The difficulty of calculating front pay with any degree of 
certll.inty makes such damages an inappropriate remedy in age discrimination cases. 
The concept of front pay does not appear in the ADEA itself. The remedies 
section simply says that civil actions may be brought "for such legal or equitable relief 
as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter," and "legal and equitable relief ... 
includes ... without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or 
promotion".3 Thus, Congress has given the courts broad authority to fashion remedies 
and front pay is the innovative remedial scheme that has emerged. Front pay was first 
proposed in law review articles which suggested that the usual remedies were 
insufficient to make whole certain workers who had been victims of discrimination. 
One author even argued that when reinstatement is not appropriate, the only way to 
make a plaintiff whole is with a front pay award.4 
·Professor, Southwest Texas State University. 
